Violence and visibility in oil palm and sugarcane conflicts : the case of Polochic Valley, Guatemala by Mingorría, Sara
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in THE 
JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES on May 2017, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/03066150.2017.1293046. 
Sara Mingorría (2017) Violence and visibility in oil palm and sugarcane conflicts: the case of Polochic 




Violence and visibility in oil palm and 




Sara Mingorría is a Post-Doc fellow at the Environmental Science and Technology 
Institute of the Autonomous University of Barcelona (ICTA-UAB). She is a member of 
the EnvJustice team (www.envjustice.org) and the Laboratory for the Analysis of Socio-




Violence and visibility in oil palm and sugarcane conflicts:  2 




Over the last two decades, the expansion of oil palm and sugarcane plantations in the 7 
Polochic Valley (Guatemala) has exacerbated the historical struggle of Maya-Q’eqchi’ 8 
peoples for land rights. Based on a mixed methods approach, I examine the dynamics of 9 
the conflict between 1998 and 2014, focusing on the visibility, manifestation and 10 
intensity of violence and the role of NGOs and peasant organizations in opposition to 11 
oil palm and sugarcane plantations. I show that the evolution of the conflict can be 12 
explained by changes in the strength of organizations alliances due to tensions, lack of 13 
coordination, as well as the fear of state repression and the funding context of these 14 
organizations. These results allow me to discuss how violence, the role of these 15 
organizations and the dynamics of related events have influenced the visibility of the 16 
conflict associated with the expansion of oil palm and sugarcane plantations in the 17 
Polochic. 18 
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In recent decades, the expansion of large areas of so-called flex-crops1, such as oil palm 24 
(Elaeis guineensis) and sugarcane (Saccharum officinarum), has led to major social and 25 
environmental change in Southeast Asia and Latin America (Borras et al 2011; FAO 26 
2014). This expansion started in 1990 (Asia) and 2000 (Latin America) due to the 27 
intensifying demand in the Northern Hemisphere for agrofuels2, edible oils, industrial 28 
lubricants and cosmetics in the case of oil palm. Sugarcane was similarly sought after in 29 
order to produce agrofuels, animal feed or fertilizers. Demand for both flex-crops has 30 
also been driven from emerging centers of international capital in the Southern 31 
Hemisphere, the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and 32 
some middle-income countries (MICs) (Borras et al 2015). Forecasts suggest that by 33 
2020 the variety and quantity of products fabricated from both crops will only continue 34 
to increase (Alonso-Fradejas et al 2016; MacKay et al 2015). Producer countries are 35 
thus facilitating the identification, quantification and provision of ‘suitable’ land for 36 
such crops (Borras et al 2013), under the assumption that there are marginal 37 
(unpopulated) lands which are apt for cultivation and that these flex-crops can solve 38 
manifold energy, climate, economic and financial crises (World Bank 2010).  39 
The expansion of these two crops alone has already led to widespread and major social 40 
and environmental changes. In Latin America, they have often prevented local 41 
communities from accessing their main livelihoods, as oil palm has been grown on land 42 
that communities could use to sow staple crops and native forests, which constitute their 43 
principle sources of food, water and building materials (Cardenas 2012; Alonso-44 
Fradejas 2012). Likewise, both sugarcane and oil palm plantations have reduced soil 45 
                                            
1 Flex-crops are commodities that have multiple and interchangeable commercial destinations. For example, palm oil 
can be sold as food, agrofuel or as an industrial product, while sugarcane can be an agrofuel or food (see Borras et al 
2014).  
2 The term ‘agrofuel’ was coined by the international Via Campesina movement to avoid the use of the prefix ‘bio’ 
that refers to life and to stress that the prime materials used for fuels come from agrarian (‘agro’) sources (Joao Pedro 
Stedile, MST-La Vía Campesina 6/06/07). In this article, I use agrofuel as a synonym for biofuel. 
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fertility and increased water and air pollution (Goldemberg et al 2008; Martinelli and 46 
Filoso 2008). Moreover, social differentiation characterizes oil palm plantations, where 47 
the poorest smallholders, the landless and women – often overlapping categories – are 48 
oftentimes unable to reap the benefits from cultivation or employment (Alonso-Fradejas 49 
2012; Cardenas 2012; Mingorría et al 2014).  50 
Many of these negative impacts could be expressed as environmental3 and/or agrarian 51 
conflicts (Dietz et al 2014; Alonso-Fradejas 2015; Gerber 2011), which may sometimes 52 
be made visible by environmental, climatic or agrarian justice movements in 53 
transnational campaigns against agrofuels, deforestation or land grabbing (Pye 2010; 54 
Brad 2015; Borras et al 2013). However, such impacts may not become visible at a 55 
national or international scale, but only at a local scale in certain phases of the conflict 56 
(Marin-Burgos 2014). With visibility I refer to conflicts that appear in national and 57 
international newspapers and are the object of public demonstrations. In this essay I 58 
assess visibility by considering any reference to the conflict in national and international 59 
media sources, specifically the printed press. In other cases in Latin America such 60 
visibility has conditioned the “success” of struggles against oil palm plantations and the 61 
decisions to change strategies of resistance (Marin-Burgos 2014). 62 
Recent studies have shown how the visibility of flex-crop conflicts might be influenced 63 
by (1) the local population’s perception of the benefit or harm caused by plantations 64 
(Castellanos-Navarrete and Jansen 2015); (2) the roles and alliances between national 65 
and international NGOs and peasant organizations (Pye 2010; Brad 2015); (3) the 66 
intensity of the violence at local groups in opposition to the expansion of oil palm 67 
plantations; and (4) whether the local population has been dispossessed or not from their 68 
land (Maher 2015; Edelman and León 2013; Alonso-Fradejas 2012; Grajales 2011). An 69 
                                            
3 This includes conflicts known as ecological, ecological-distributive, socio-environmental or ecological-social and 
conflicts with environmental content.  
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example of a conflict that has been visibilized is the accelerated expansion of oil palm 70 
in Indonesia, where European and Indonesian environmental and agrarian movements 71 
have developed transnational campaigns from shared anti-agrofuel activism. The 72 
campaigns highlighted the loss of biodiversity, problems of climate change, 73 
dispossession of land and the violation of human rights associated with oil palm 74 
plantations (Pye 2010; Grajales 2015; Brad 2015). According to Pye (2010), the anti-75 
agrofuels campaign has been successful in: (1) creating transnational debates regarding 76 
the main environmental impacts of oil palm plantations and agrofuel production; (2) 77 
forging alliances between Indonesian grassroots movements and transnational 78 
movements; (3) linking environmental problems with agrarian and human rights issues; 79 
and (4) including sustainability criteria on agrofuel production in the European 80 
Renewable Energy Directive (EU 2008, article 17).  81 
Recently, studies of oil palm and sugarcane plantation-related conflicts have focused on 82 
understanding the role played by agrarian and environmental NGOs at regional 83 
(Wolford 2004), national (Brad 2014), and transnational (Pye 2010) scales; or on 84 
exploring the conflict from the perspective of local populations (Castellanos-Navarrete 85 
and Jansen 2014; Edelmán and León 2013; Alonso-Fradejas 2015). This article 86 
contributes to this body of literature by identifying the factors that have influenced the 87 
visibility of conflict generated by flex-crops in the Polochic Valley (hereinafter 88 
‘Polochic’), Guatemala. In this region, three quarters of the fertile land (more than 89 
10,000 hectares) have been occupied by oil palm and sugarcane plantations since 1998 90 
and 2005 respectively (Alonso-Fradejas et al 2012; Mingorria et al 2014), resulting in 91 
recurring and state-acknowledged land conflicts (SAA 2014). However, these conflicts 92 
only became internationally known in 2011, after NGOs denounced ongoing violations 93 
of land and human rights (OACNUDH 2013). 94 
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 When I talk about conflicts in this article, I refer to disputes and confrontations, visible 95 
or invisible, which occur as a result of flex-crops plantations and/or their expansion. 96 
Such disputes can be related to their environmental impacts, potentially resulting in 97 
changes in land tenure and resource access relations, and over labor rights and working 98 
conditions (Borras et al 2010; Marin-Burgos 2014). In the Polochic, oil palm and 99 
sugarcane plantation conflict is manifested through Q’eqchi’ groups and a diverse types 100 
of social organizations in opposition to the expansion of flex-crops that are controlled 101 
by two oligarchic families present in the Polochic. The main arguments in opposition to 102 
this expansion are that the growth of flex-crops has generated water pollution, 103 
exploitative labor conditions and/or the impossibility of Q’eqchi’ population to access 104 
land; as well as direct violence, which is understood by Q’eqchi’ groups, in similar way 105 
as that describe by WHO (1996)  individual physical and physiological harm or subtle 106 
forms of coercion4.   107 
 The conflict is analyzed by applying a variety of methods a temporal (1998-2014) and 108 
multi-scale (local, national and transnational) perspective. Upon identifying the main 109 
phases of the conflict, I examine (1) the visibility/invisibility of the conflict and the 110 
interactions among Q’eqchi’ groups that are in opposition to flex-crops, NGOs, peasant 111 
organizations, oligarchic families and government institutions; (2) the manifestation and 112 
intensity of the directed violence against local groups in opposition; (3) the roles and 113 
interrelations among local, national and transnational NGOs and peasant organizations; 114 
and (4) NGOs’ perception of the current state of the conflict and future forecasts. These 115 
are some of the factors have influenced the evolution of the conflict and explain its 116 
multifaceted nature, echoing what has happened in other flex-crops conflicts in Latin 117 
America (Marin-Burgos 2014).    118 
                                            
4 These arguments come from the minutes of three national peasants meeting against flex-crops in Guatemala (2009 
and 2010).  
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In this essay, I consider NGOs 5  as the organizations that give support to local 119 
communities and act as advocacy groups (Clarck 1991). I treat peasant organizations 120 
(CUC and UVOC) separately as I recognize they are based on grassroots memberships. 121 
In the text I will use the general term “organizations” when I refer to both of them. 122 
The Polochic Valley: sugarcane and oil palm expansion 123 
The Polochic Valley is located in northeastern Guatemala, in the departments of Alta 124 
Verapaz and Izabal (Figure 1). This agrarian frontier was officially reshaped in 1990, 125 
when two protected areas were established: the Sierra de las Minas Reserve (195,000 126 
hectares) and the Sierra de Santa Cruz (72,000 hectares). These protected areas coexist 127 
with indigenous cultivators, the mining industry, traditional coffee estates and cattle 128 
ranchers, and more recently sugarcane and oil palm plantations. Eighty-nine per cent of 129 
the population is Maya-Q’eqchi’ and Poqomchi, found across 220 communities or in 130 
the towns of Tamahú, Tucurú, La Tinta, Senahú, Panzós and El Estor. The majority of 131 
indigenous inhabitants are landless or land poor, living from swidden (slash and burn) 132 
agriculture and complementing their subsistence-based livelihoods with cash-crop 133 
production or as seasonal workers (Alonso-Fradejas 2012).  134 
<Insert Figure 1: POLOCHIC VALLEY> 135 
According to the Secretariat of Agrarian Affairs (SAA), most recorded conflicts in the 136 
Polochic are due to “land occupations”, where private ownership is “not respected” by 137 
indigenous-peasant communities (SAA 2010). However, for those supporting the 138 
Polochic’s indigenous-peasant communities, the “occupations" are not the cause of the 139 
conflict, but the consequence (Hurtado 2008, Granovsky-Larsen 2013). They are rather 140 
their main strategy to access land for subsistence purposes given the unequal 141 
                                            
5 I included a variety of NGOs that defined themselves as human right organizations, foundations or research 
institutes.   
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distribution of arable land and the historical system of labor exploitation that 142 
characterizes the history of the Polochic (Castellanos Cambranes 1996, Van Leeuwen 143 
2010, Hurtado 2008).  144 
The chronicles of land conflict in the Polochic date back to the 16th century, when the 145 
Spanish Catholic Church controlled land and local populations through “Indian 146 
Villages” 6 (Hurtado 2008). The commodification of land that started in the 19th century 147 
has continued until present, as land has been (re)concentrated to ease the expansion of 148 
oil palm and sugarcane plantations (Hurtado 2014). However, part of the Maya-149 
Q’eqchi’ people have historically responded to these processes by fleeing wage labor 150 
controls, violence and the plunder of their lands, by migrating deeper into Guatemala in 151 
search of land to reproduce their livelihoods (Grandia 2006). Most of the Polochic is 152 
currently under the control of two oligarchic families, and even the communities that 153 
fled to forested areas are now in conflict with company and/or government-controlled 154 
protected areas, hydroelectric dams and mining projects (Hurtado 2014). 155 
It was after the liberal reforms of the late 19th century that the state granted most of the 156 
land in the Polochic as private estates to foreign families and companies, in order to 157 
develop an export-oriented economy based on cattle, cotton, bananas and coffee 158 
plantations (Hurtado 2008; Grandia 2006). The Maya-Q’eqchi’ population that had 159 
previously lived in “Indian Villages” was forced to migrate or work on the estates as 160 
mozos-colonos or bonded laborers (Hurtado 2008). The patron provided a small piece of 161 
land on the estates for bonded laborers to grow their own food and, despite poor wages, 162 
forced families to purchase food from his own over-priced shop. Families were thus 163 
kept on estates under a flexible debt system (Piedrasanta 1977). 164 
                                            
6 The Spanish conquest of the Q’eqchi’ region (Alta Verapaz) was, relatively speaking, more peaceful than in the rest 
of Guatemala (Secaria 1992). However, during the conquest the Spanish church gathered the indigenous population 
in “Indian Villages” to appropriate their lands and more easily charge them taxes on behalf of the Spanish Crown.  
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The period of greatest violence and visibility of these conflicts on a transnational scale 165 
occurred during the 36 years of the Guatemalan civil war and concluded with the 166 
signing of the Peace Accords in 1996 (Sanford 2009, Grandin 2004). One of the most 167 
violent events happened in Panzós in 1978, when the army massacred fifty-three Maya-168 
Q’eqchi’ peasants demanding access to land (CEH 1999). Thousands of people fled 169 
from the Polochic during the civil war (Grandia 2006). In the early 2000s the coffee 170 
crisis ended the mozos-colonos system (Wagner 2001), breaking the fetter between 171 
patrons and the bonded laborers’ families. In the wake of this rupture, some families 172 
were expelled from the estates without receiving any labor benefits and became landless 173 
while others stayed on the land as ‘squatters’ or became seasonal workers (Hurtado 174 
2008, Grandia 2006). 175 
Meanwhile, in 1998, the descendants of the German family Maegli set up an oil 176 
processing plant. And in 2005 a sugarcane mill called Chabil Utz’ aj (‘good cane’ in the 177 
Q’eqchi’ language) owned by the Widdman family, was moved from the Southern 178 
Pacific region to the Polochic thanks to a two million dollar loan from the Central 179 
American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE). In the Polochic, these two oligarchic 180 
families currently control about 5,000 hectares of oil palm and 8,500 hectares of 181 
sugarcane plantations, making up one-third of the valley’s fertile land (Alonso-Fradejas 182 
2012). These families were able to expand their flex-crop plantations throughout the 183 
territory either by purchasing land from cattle ranchers or by renting it for a five year 184 
period. 185 
Part of the Maya-Q’eqchi’ population in the Polochic, some landless families, former 186 
bonded laborers, plantation workers and households with insecure land tenure are 187 
struggling to defend their territory against the expansion of flex-crops through a variety 188 
of collective and individual strategies (Alonso-Fradejas 2015). Consequently, in the past 189 
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two decades, the agrarian conflict in the Polochic has escalated around the land dispute 190 
between the two families that control the flex-crop production and the groups that claim 191 
that same land to grow staple crops (Hurtado 2014; Migorría et al 2014).  192 
Over thirty per cent of the agrarian conflicts registered in Guatemala in 2010 were 193 
located in the Polochic (SAA 2010), but these were ‘invisible’ on a national and 194 
international scale between the signing of the Peace Accords (1996) and March, (2011), 195 
when the state violently evicted the Maya-Q’eqchi’ communities ‘occupying’ some 196 
estates in the Polochic, in an action that was highly mediatized (OACNUDH 2013; 197 
UDEFEGUA 2011; GIDHS 2013).  198 
Two years later, after national and international demonstrations, some national and 199 
international NGOs and a national peasant organization depicted the government’s 200 
handover of land (partially outside of the Polochic) to some of the previously evicted 201 
families as the consequence of successful social mobilization and resistance (Velazquez 202 
2014). Subsequently, all international and some national NGOs stopped paying 203 
attention to the struggle. However, violent conflict and the crops’ expansion continued 204 
as the government had failed to deal with the underlying roots of the problem, i.e. 205 
unequal land distribution in favor of a few oligarchic families and their agribusiness 206 
model. This paper argues that there were multiple factors affecting the exit of 207 
organizations and the seeming “success” of the case. I also discuss how structural 208 
violence, the role of the state, as well as the different strategies of organizations 209 
deployed, have contributed to weaken the resistance against flex-crops in the Polochic 210 
and to reveal or silence the conflict. 211 
 212 
Methodological and analytical strategy  213 
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Data collection through participant observation, semi-structured interviews, discourse 214 
analysis and content analysis of the printed press and video documentaries (Figure 2), 215 
was triangulated to provide as complete a picture as possible of the conflict period. The 216 
analysis begins with the arrival of the oil palm and sugarcane plantations in 1998 and 217 
2005 respectively, in the municipalities of Panzós and El Estor, and concludes at the 218 
end of 2014 when land was finally handed over to some of the evicted families.  219 
<Insert FIGURE 2 METHODOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES> 220 
Participant observation 221 
From my observations as a researcher and activist during three periods of fieldwork in 222 
the Polochic (January 2009-May 2011; January 2012; August 2014) I identified and 223 
interviewed members of the NGOs and peasant organizations that were involved in the 224 
conflict and opposed the expansion of flex-crops. I pinpointed the events that caused a 225 
change in the dynamic of the conflict in terms of its visibility/invisibility, the intensity 226 
of the violence exerted against the Q’eqchi’ communities and these organization roles 227 
and alliances. I evaluated the violence from very low (isolated evictions), to low 228 
(injuries, shootings and isolated evictions), high (injuries, shootings, kidnappings, 229 
violent and constant evictions) or very high (killings, injuries and shootings 230 
concentrated over days). I identified eight organization roles and four types of alliances 231 
(Table 1). Subsequently, I analyzed the general positions of Maya-Q’eqchi’ community 232 
members in relation to the conflict, focusing on those members who participated in 233 
national meetings organized by NGOs and a peasant organization to define strategies 234 
against flex-crops. 235 
During the first period of fieldwork, I attended meetings with organizations and 236 
indigenous representatives, where resistance strategies against the expansion of oil palm 237 
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and sugarcane plantations in Guatemala were discussed7. At the same time, I lived with 238 
the Maya-Q’eqchi’ population during two active participant research projects8 in 2009 239 
and 2011, and observed two land occupations in 2010 and the evictions of 2011. During 240 
these phases, I analyzed the information obtained from meeting minutes. The 241 
occupations and evictions were also recorded in two video-documentaries9 where I was 242 
part of the executive production, research and interview team. From this experience and 243 
the material it generated, I analyzed the arguments against the plantations by Maya-244 
Q’eqchi’ people who attended the meetings, as well as the reasons presented by the 245 
oligarchic families’ to legitimize the evictions. 246 
Semi-structured interviews 247 
During 2014, I conducted a total of 17 interviews with representatives of 9 NGOs and 2 248 
peasant organizations (Appendix). I categorized the organizations as local, national or 249 
international (and/or donors), depending on their most common scale of operation; and 250 
as human rights, development and research and advocacy NGOs and peasant 251 
organizations depending on their focus and objectives (Appendix). These interviews 252 
served to: (1) validate the phases defined during participant observation; (2) analyze the 253 
roles of and interrelations between organizations; and 3) examine the organizations’ 254 
perceptions of the state of the conflict in the final stage of analysis (2014).  255 
<Insert TABLE 1 ROLE AND ALLIANCE DEFINITIONS> 256 
My different roles during the research process – as an “external” researcher, peasant 257 
organization consultant, human rights evaluator, scholar-activist and witness of the 258 
                                            
7 This activity included three national (14 communities represented from the Polochic) and three regional (44 
communities represented) meetings. 
8 ‘Desarrollo de un marco de evaluación analítico-participativo de las dinámicas socioambientales y de la calidad de 
vida de las comunidades campesinas del Valle del río Polochic, Guatemala’. IDEAR-CONGCOOP, 2009-2010. 
Funded by ACCD. ‘Mecanismo de respuesta rápida frente a la fuerte subida de los precios de los productos 
alimenticios en los países en desarrollo’. CUC and FGT, 2010-2011. Funded by Oikos-EU.  
9 The video-documentaries are titled: The evictions in the Polochic Valley 2011 and Aj Ral choch (Sons of the earth), 
2012 and were co-produced by IDEAR-CONGCOOP and Caracolproducciones: (see http://caracolproductions.net/). 
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March 2011 evictions – allowed me to gain the trust of the majority of the interviewees 259 
and to show my commitment to what was happening on the ground. During the 260 
interviews I explained that I have continued researching the conflict in the Polochic for 261 
my personal interest, in order to contribute to activism in Guatemala. These elements 262 
helped me gather responses that were not accommodating and polite but diverse and 263 
critical.  264 
Content analysis 265 
I analyzed the content of three types of documents: written press, human right reports, 266 
and the two video-documentaries I was involved in producing. I used these three 267 
sources of information because I could not hold face-to-face interviews with all of the 268 
stakeholders in the conflict. This was due to the multiplicity of roles I had during my 269 
time in Guatemala, which were not aligned with the interests and rationale of the 270 
agribusiness families. The analysis was used to (1) validate the defined phases of the 271 
conflict through changes in its visibility; (2) identify the phases of greater and lesser 272 
visibility of the conflict through the number of news stories published; and (3) describe 273 
the changes in the arguments and stances of the oligarchic families and state institutions 274 
in relation to the causes of the conflict.  275 
On the one hand, I compiled all news in Guatemala’s main newspapers (Prensa Libre, 276 
El Periódico, Diario de Centro América and Plaza Pública) from 1998 to 2014 and 277 
collected the references made on the conflict. I also included news that appeared from 278 
2005 to 2014 found with the Google search term ‘Valle del Polochic’, resulting in a 279 
total of 160 articles. To analyze this material, I counted the number of news stories and 280 
opinion articles in each phase, conducted a lexicometrical analysis using the Iramuteq 281 
program to identify the predominant content published during the phases of the conflict 282 
and, additionally, analyzed the arguments and positions regarding the causes of the 283 
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conflict mobilized by all actors in each phase of the conflict. Finally, I reviewed the 284 
content of 10 reports on human rights violations and press releases by NGOs and 285 
peasant organizations that were published between 2000 and 2014. The content analysis 286 
involved identifying the strategies and complaints made by these organizations over 287 
time. 288 
The evolution of the conflict 289 
The visibility of the conflict from the arrival of oil palm and sugarcane plantations until 290 
2014 has changed in relation to: the intensity of the violence and the organizations’ 291 
strategies, roles and alliances. Taking these criteria into consideration, I identified three 292 
phases of the conflict: 1) the silenced phase, from the arrival of the plantations in 1998 293 
until the violent eviction of 12 Maya-Q’eqchi’ communities in 2011; 2) the revealed 294 
phase, from the evictions until a year later, in March 2012; and 3) the silencing phase, 295 
which began in March 2012 with the Indigenous, Peasant and Popular March and ended 296 
in 2014 with the government’s handover of land to less than a fifth of the evicted 297 
families (Table 2).  298 
<Insert TABLE 2 PHASES CARACTERIZATION> 299 
Silenced conflict (1998-2011)  300 
Oil palm plantation expansion in the Polochic began silently in 1998. While conflicts 301 
were generated by this expansion (Hurtado 2008), they were not framed as such in the 302 
printed press10. However, the expansion of sugarcane from 2005 was reported in two 303 
news articles as an opportunity to develop the local economy (see Dürr 2016 for a 304 
critical perspective). Oil palm and sugarcane underwent their greatest expansion during 305 
                                            
10 There are many possible reasons why the media did not report land grabbing conflicts and why there 
were no mobilizations. Although conflict related to land was still present, I think that the media and 
NGOs were focused on the discussion and promotion of 1996 Peace Accords. Land issues and indigenous 
rights were approached from this supposedly “post conflict phase”. Therefore, NGOs somehow left these 
conflicts behind and the media did not want to show a possible failure of the Peace Accords. 
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this phase, coming to occupy about 10,000 hectares of the Polochic (Alonso-Fradejas 306 
2012, Hurtado 2008). Peasant organization in the region, promoted and supported the 307 
collective organization of the former bonded laborers to demand recognition of their 308 
land and labor rights, in some cases demanding monetary or land compensation, and in 309 
others settlements for their years of unpaid labor on the estates (Granovsky-Larsen 310 
2013). From 2000 onwards, these peasant organizations gave their support to the land 311 
occupations in Tamahú, Tucurú and Senahú and promoted the creation of a unified front 312 
for the ‘recovery of the land’, organizing both the ‘landless’ population and the former 313 
bonded laborers (Hurtado 2008).  314 
National and local NGOs (FGT in 1998, ECAP in 2000 and CONCAD in 2004), 315 
appeared in the region to provide psychosocial, technical and organizational support to 316 
the Maya-Q’eqchi’ communities. In 2005 CONGCOOP started working in the region, 317 
while other NGOs connected their work to the expansion of oil palm and sugarcane 318 
(Appendix). This date coincides with the transfer of the sugarcane mill from the 319 
Southern Pacific region to the Polochic (Figure 3). 320 
<Insert FIGURE 3 TIME LINE PHASE SILENCED> 321 
In 2008, after generating an atmosphere of trust, these organizations discussed with the 322 
local population the causes and elements of the conflict in the region. As a results, the 323 
NGOs highlighted the psychosocial problems associated with the civil war 324 
(Interview#1); the communities’ long and unresolved demands for access to land 325 
(Interview#10); and the socio-economic impacts of the rapid expansion of oil palm and 326 
sugarcane plantations and processing plants due to the current national policies that 327 
favor business groups and the global economic dynamics of flex-crops’ expansion 328 
(Alonso-Fradejas 2008, Solano and Solís 2010, Mingorria & Gamboa 2010).  329 
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In 2009, the five NGOs and two-peasant organization mentioned in the silenced phase 330 
formed a coalition to stop the advance of oil palm and sugarcane plantations. The 331 
coalition included a new research-based NGO, El Observador (Interview#12) (Figure 332 
3). The formation of this coalition meant that the roles of most NGOs shifted from one 333 
of community support to facilitating horizontal interaction and joint resistance. To do 334 
this, they arranged three national peasant meetings in July 2009, November 2009 and 335 
August 2010 as well as two regional meetings in the Polochic, in August and September 336 
2009 (Figure 3). These meetings aimed at exchanging information between organization 337 
and Maya-Q’eqchi’ communities, analyzing their different positions in relation to flex-338 
crops and defining joint strategies against the expansion of flex-crops. 339 
During these meetings, the Maya-Q’eqchi’ communities also expressed their opposition 340 
to flex-crops due to the socio-economic, cultural and environmental damage they 341 
generated. They hence defined lines of action aimed at defending their territory and 342 
reinforcing the internal cohesion and the networks between Maya-Q’eqchi’ 343 
communities. To do so, they formed the Council of Q’eqchi’ Communities in 344 
Resistance, which in 2010 decided to organize the occupation of ten sugarcane 345 
plantations in the Polochic. The objective of these occupations was pressure the 346 
government into buying the 37 estates owned by the Widdman family that were being 347 
auctioned at the time by Guatemala’s Industrial National Bank (BI), as a result of the 348 
sugarcane mill’s bankruptcy and not fulfilling its credit obligations (ElPeriódico August 349 
6, 2010, Interview#12). 350 
According to one Maya-Q’eqchi’ I spoke with, the occupations also came out of 351 
necessity, in order to plant maize, and as a form of resistance. He felt that 352 
“sowing[maize] is the struggle and the reason to keep on struggling” (Maya-Q’eqchi’ 353 
leader in occupied community, 2010). Likewise, during the ceremonies conducted 354 
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during the occupations, the spiritual value of maize and land for the Maya-Q’eqchi’, 355 
compared to the negligent value of sugarcane was starkly apparent:  356 
‘All the food collected in our home makes us who we are, but maize is our body. 357 
Sugarcane is not of us, we do not sow it. We harvest beans, maize and chili. 358 
Corncobs – the black, the yellow – are our body’ (Occupied community spiritual 359 
guide, 2010). 360 
However, the new wave of occupations was met with violent from the sugarcane 361 
company’s private security forces (OACNUDH 2013). Given this intensification of the 362 
conflict over access to land, the government organized several formal talks involving 363 
state institutions, business people, community representatives and some national 364 
organizations (Interview#5). Simultaneously, these organizations negotiated with the 365 
government and the BCIE so that the state would buy the recently occupied land 366 
(Interview#12). Despite the high intensity of the violence against the Maya-Q’eqchi’, 367 
the conflict was not reported in the media, and the protests, negotiations, land 368 
occupations and the subsequent repression were silenced on a national and international 369 
scale (Table 2). 370 
Revealed conflict (2011-2012)  371 
In this phase the Polochic conflict became known nationally and internationally through 372 
news articles and opinion pieces published in national and international media (Table 373 
2), including a documentary about the evictions broadcasted on national television. This 374 
phase covers both the violent conflict and post-eviction phases: the former involving the 375 
eviction of 800 families from 12 communities in the Polochic; between the15-and 19 of 376 
March 2011. The post-eviction phase ran until March 2012 (Figure 4).  377 
<Insert FIGURE 4 TIMELINE PHASE REVEALED> 378 
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For the first time in Guatemala, 14 estates were included in the same court-issued 379 
eviction order (of which, 12 were executed). The Widdman family oversaw the 380 
evictions, accompanied by employees of the Public Ministry, the state agency in charge 381 
of executing court orders, and around 1000 soldiers and the national police (special 382 
operations commandos). The oligarchic families pressured the military into burning 383 
crops, deciding an exact date and time for the evictions, as to avoid being observed by 384 
organization members, and compelled the Ministry of Public Affairs to follow the 385 
judge’s orders. These power relations were explicitly described in statements by the 386 
Widdman family during the eviction recorded in the 2011 documentary titled “Polochic 387 
evictions”: “The Ministry told me: ‘well, this eviction is going to be very difficult,’ and I 388 
told him: ‘for God’s sake Minister, execute the order for seizure of the land issued by 389 
the competent judge! If not, you are obstructing the law.’” 390 
Around 800 families were violently evicted, the National Civil Police killed a peasant, 391 
dozens of people were injured and the homes and 1,800 hectares of staple crops were 392 
razed or destroyed (OACNUDH 2013, UDEFEGUA 2011). Crop loss meant more than 393 
material damage: it was also spiritually and culturally painful. As one Maya Q’eqchi’ 394 
woman told me in an interview, “it is as if my son was dying, the land is no longer 395 
alive”. Moreover, for some of the population it was a throwback to the violence of the 396 
Civil War, where the military used the burning down of homes and crops as a strategy 397 
to prevent the population from returning to their villages (Interview#12, 9). 398 
The presence of NGO and peasant organization members in the area meant that the 399 
news of the evictions reached the national and international press. Otherwise, the 400 
community did not have the authority or contacts to ensure media coverage of the 401 
violence enacted by the Widdman family and the government. In turn, these 402 
organizations held press conferences and publicly denounced the evictions, asking that 403 
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at the very least the evictions be carried out in a non-violent manner, leaving houses 404 
intact and allowing people to harvest their crops. These demands were however 405 
unaddressed. 406 
In the wake of these violent events, five of the organizations in the coalition remained 407 
allied and once again changed their role to protest against the suffering of the families in 408 
the Polochic. The coalition condemned the violence, the excessive use of force by the 409 
army and the national police and the violation of the right to housing, food and 410 
indigenous culture in national and international venues, including the Inter-American 411 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 11 (Figure 4).  412 
The Widdman family, however, accused the Maya-Q’eqchi’ population of violating the 413 
right to private land ownership and the NGOs and peasant organization of subverting 414 
the rule of law. During the evictions, that family proclaimed, “laws should be observed! 415 
Rule of law!” (Polochic evictions video-documentary 2011), while the government 416 
accused organizations of being “radicals that have systematically implemented illegal 417 
measures […] that have affected the rights of other Guatemalans and put governability 418 
and the rule of law at great risk” (Presidential announcement 17/03/2015).  419 
In June 2011, the IACHR requested Guatemala to take the necessary precautionary 420 
measures 12  to guarantee the life, integrity, food and homes of the twelve evicted 421 
communities and to investigate the killing of one peasant during the evictions 422 
(OACNUDH 2013). In spite of such request, violence continued and three more 423 
peasants were killed a few months later (UDEFEGUA 2011). Some Maya-Q’eqchi’ 424 
                                            
11 The IACHR: the main and autonomous agency of the Organization of American States (OAS) that is responsible 
for promoting and protecting human rights in the Americas. A summary of the Precautionary Measures can be found 
at www.cidh.org with Ref: 14 comunidades indígenas Q’echi del Municipio de Panzos MC-121-11, Guatemala. The 
petitioning NGOs were: the CUC, FGT, ECAP, Human Rights Commission, Rights Action and ULAM (Women’s 
Union). 
12 Precautionary measures: these are measures recommended to states by the IACHR when situations arise where 
irreparable damage could be caused to people. These include situations of conflict, violence or persecution of the 
defenders of human rights which if not ceased could lead to an increase in the number of deaths.   
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families tried to immediately occupy again the evicted lands, and the sugarcane 425 
company’s private security alongside the police responded again with violence (GIDHS 426 
2013). Following the IACHR issue of the precautionary measures, the number of 427 
organizations in the coalition fell, and only three national organizations continued to 428 
condemn the events in alliance with international human rights NGOs. However, these 429 
relations also weakened (Figure 4).    430 
Silencing conflict (2012-2014) 431 
The conflict initially remained visible on a national and transnational scale, with public 432 
debates regarding the country’s history of agrarian conflict between March 2012 and 433 
February 2013. The content of the news items related the evictions in the Polochic to 434 
the violence of the Guatemalan civil war and the historic demands of the peasantry such 435 
as access to land, agrarian debt forgiveness, a law on Integrated Rural Development, the 436 
moratorium on mining licenses and territorial demilitarization (Table 2). However from 437 
February 2013-August 2014, the visibility of the conflict began to dwindle, with fewer 438 
stories being published in the national press and focusing solely on the relocation of the 439 
families (Table 2).  440 
<Insert FIGURE 5 TIMELINE PHASE SILENCING> 441 
This visibility between March 2012 and February 2013 was largely due to the 200-442 
kilometer Indigenous, Peasant and Popular March that took place in early 2012 (from 443 
Cobán municipality in Alta Verapaz department, to Guatemala City), and involved 444 
NGOs, peasant organizations, trade unions, community representatives and women’s 445 
organizations. The launch of an international campaign in favor of the evicted families 446 
(Crece-Vamos al grano), organized by Intermón Oxfam in February 2013, also 447 
increased the visibility of the conflict (Figure 5). These forms of protest emerged in 448 
response to the government’s non-compliance with the precautionary measures; i.e., the 449 
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violence continued, land was not provided, and not enough provisions were given to the 450 
evicted families (Interview#16, 4). The march was led by the CUC, and the FGT, 451 
CONGCOOP and representatives of the evicted communities also took part. After the 452 
demonstration, the Intermón Oxfam campaign managed to get the conflict onto the 453 
public agenda and put pressure on the government by revealing the social and financial 454 
plight of the evicted families through protest actions and delivering a petition with over 455 
100,000 signatures to the government demanding land for the families. This campaign 456 
was coordinated in Guatemala exclusively by the CUC, preventing the participation of 457 
other national and international organizations. According to Oxfam, an alliance with a 458 
single organization made the campaign easier to manage. However, at the same time, 459 
this led to the breakdown of alliances with other organizations, and caused the CUC to 460 
shift from being a protest group to focus solely on the campaign agenda (Interview#17) 461 
(Figure 5). 462 
Following the announcement of the land allocation to the Q’eqchi families in June 463 
2013, the conflict’s apparent outcome was Janus-faced. On the one hand, success was 464 
touted in CUC, CONGCOOP and Intermón Oxfam’s reports, social networks and 465 
websites.13 These sources highlighted various achievements: land allocation for 140 466 
families (Velazquez 2014); raising awareness of the global problem of land grabbing 467 
through the case of the Polochic; and achieving the international campaign targets. For 468 
example, the CUC celebrated the second handover of land with statements on its social 469 
networks such as “today our tears are the tears of joy: Victory for the violently evicted 470 
families and victory for national and international organizations!” (Facebook CUC 10th 471 
August 2014). 472 







On the other hand, however, during my fieldwork in August 2014 (the second land 473 
reallocation process), I realized that all organizations also perceived the outcomes 474 
partially as a failure. The structural problems regarding land access, the expansion of 475 
the plantations and the violence directed against the communities had not been resolved 476 
(Interview#4, 11, 8). The conflict was delocalized, with 110 families relocated away 477 
from the Polochic to another highly conflictive area of the country (Interview#2) 478 
without meeting minimal subsistence conditions.  479 
Moreover, resistance in the Polochic had been weakened because the organizations fled 480 
the region and their alliances with Maya-Q’eqchi’ communities were debilitated. 481 
According to international human rights NGOs, the weakening of such alliances was the 482 
result of the difficulties of working in a human rights framework within contexts of 483 
systematic violence: “we could spend at least 14 years denouncing the state for not 484 
recognizing indigenous rights, however it is important to understand and to know how 485 
to do it” (Interview#8). The effort required to coordinate very different kinds of 486 
organizations was also repeated, as was the lack of time, financial resources and fatigue: 487 
“It was difficult to coordinate meetings and define actions, we were not all working 488 
along the same lines and information was not shared because of distrust” 489 
(Interview#10, Inverview#9). The direct alliances between Maya-Q’eqchi’ communities 490 
and national peasant and NGOs also weakened because of the increasing insecurity in 491 
the Polochic. “The situation became unsustainable, we received a lot of threats, you 492 
could tell that you were being followed … it was not worth risking my life” 493 
(Interview#1).  494 
Future perspectives of the Polochic conflict 495 
Overall, after analyzing these three phases of the conflict in the Polochic from 1998 to 496 
2014, it is evident that the government did not comply with its commitment to distribute 497 
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land among indigenous communities or halt the advancement of sugarcane and oil palm 498 
plantations. In 2014 the BCIE restructured the Widdman family’s outstanding debt, 499 
while an oligarchic family from Nicaragua (Grupo Pellas) bought 80 per cent of the 500 
company’s shares and further invested 40 million dollars in the sugarcane expansion 501 
project (Interview#3). This explains why most organization believed that the situation in 502 
the Polochic would only get worse after 2014, with the conflict intensifying and 503 
resistance being repressed. 504 
The interviews, however, showed that there is no consensus within or among the 505 
organizations as to how the conflict in the Polochic should be approached from now on. 506 
Some international NGOs believe that the work should consist in putting pressure on 507 
the government through institutions such as the World Bank and involving other 508 
countries’ public opinion (Interview#17). However, some national peasant 509 
organizations and NGOs argued that the strategy should now consist in regionalizing 510 
the struggle and to work locally and the overarching objective would be to connect their 511 
fight with other struggles, such as the opposition to extractive projects such as mining 512 
and major hydroelectric plants.  513 
Both proposals, campaigning from abroad and regionalizing resistance, are based on the 514 
development of alliances. However, while some national organizations vouch for 515 
alliances between international NGOs and their local partners, others aim to coordinate 516 
nationally through a United Peasant Front and to develop local alliances through 517 
community-based and grassroots organization. In all cases, nonetheless, organizations 518 
recognize the need to “overcome the broken ties between organizations” 519 
(Interview#10).  520 
Discussion 521 
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The results section analyzed the typologies and visibility of the conflict in the Polochic 522 
from a multi-scale and temporal approach. They showed how the interrelations between 523 
violence/threat, the role of the state, and the type, strategies and alliances of NGOs and 524 
peasant organizations have influenced the visibility and dynamic of the conflict at 525 
different scales. The agrarian and human rights conflict was visible at all spatial scales 526 
(regional, national and international); the environmental conflict was only visible at 527 
peasant meetings.  528 
The role of violence and fear in the Polochic conflict 529 
The expansion of flex-crops in the Polochic has exacerbated the historical land dispute 530 
between the Maya-Q’eqchi’ communities and the oligarchic families. These 531 
communities have struggled for more than 500 years to recover the land they had been 532 
dispossessed from: beginning in the colonial era, through to liberal reforms and the 533 
development of the agro-export model of cotton, banana, beef and coffee farming 534 
(Hurtado 2008; Grandia 2009; Castellanos 1996), until the spread of oil palm and 535 
sugarcane plantations in the present day. In this new phase of dispossession, the demand 536 
for land has been visible through land occupations in the silenced phase, and protests 537 
and campaigns on a national and international scale during the revealed and silencing 538 
phases.  539 
However, the high level of violence has been the main factor affecting the visibility of 540 
the conflict, focusing the debate and the struggle on land access issues and masking the 541 
communities’ arguments in relation to the environmental and cultural impacts of flex-542 
crop. It is important to underline that the Polochic is not an isolated case: one of the 543 
main historical drivers of rural violence throughout Latin America is the unequal 544 
distribution of land (Kay 2001). The latter is also explicitly related to the mechanisms 545 
for the expansion of monocultures like oil palm plantations (Alonso-Fradejas 2012; 546 
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Grajales 2015; Maher 2015; Edelmán and León 2013). Violence in the Polochic is 547 
associated with the mechanisms of expansion and dispossession of land: direct violence 548 
recognized by human rights framework (NN.UU 2007). There was violence in all 549 
phases of the conflict, from threats, intimidation and the presence of the company’s 550 
armed private security to killings, kidnappings and violent evictions. This violence had 551 
a strong demobilizing effect, as it was applied to a population that had already been 552 
heavily repressed (Hurtado 2008). During all phases, violence, and the fear instilled in 553 
the minds of the Maya-Q’eqchi’ that lived through the Guatemalan civil war, 554 
suppressed the local indigenous people’s arguments against oil palm and sugarcane 555 
plantations. Social fear is a complex collective experience (Pain and Smith 2008) that 556 
can be unleashed by isolated events, such as the Panzós Massacre of 1978 (CEH 1999), 557 
and by everyday events, like the presence of private security forces, or symbols that 558 
bring back memories of the Guatemalan civil war, such as military uniforms, a scorched 559 
earth military strategy – burning of homes and crops – to ensure the permanent dispersal 560 
of the population, or government announcements outlawing protests.  561 
In Guatemala, the threat of violence as a means to generate fear has been systematically 562 
used to muffle the peasant struggle for land in the past and in the present (Ibarra 2009). 563 
Scott (1986) argues that in contexts of strong repression and violence like those 564 
described earlier, the oppressed population develops silent resistance strategies and its 565 
oppositional arguments are only shared in secret. Scott (2008) argues that it is only 566 
when fear is overcome that visible rebellions and protest actions occur. However, the 567 
Maya-Q’eqchi’ occupied lands without having overcome their fear, driven instead by 568 
the need to feed themselves, by their indigenous identity that attributes a sacred value to 569 
the land and maize, and by the historic support of peasant organizations. However, the 570 
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state accused such occupiers of exercising violence, invading private property and 571 
fueling the conflict. 572 
The role of organizations competing types, strategies and alliances in the conflict 573 
The role and alliances between NGOs, peasant organizations and communities were 574 
also key factors for visibilizing the conflict on a national and international scale, in 575 
particular through organized claims and protests. These organizations gave financial and 576 
methodological support to the land occupations and the organization of peasant 577 
meetings during the silenced phase. During this phase, indigenous communities who 578 
depended directly on natural resources for subsistence defended their environment from 579 
the likely impacts of flex-crops. However, this “environmentalism of the poor” 580 
(Martinez-Alier 2002) was not visible on a national or international scale – despite river 581 
diversion and contamination, soil degradation (Alonso-Fradejas 2012) –, probably 582 
because environmental organizations did not offer sufficient support. These results 583 
stand in stark contrast to those found on a transnational scale, where environmental 584 
organizations have led the protests against oil palm plantations on the grounds of their 585 
impacts to deforestation and biodiversity (Koh & Wilcove 2007; Venter et al 2008).  586 
As the conflict developed, diverse national organizations and international human rights 587 
NGOs built alliances, which led to the conflict being depicted as one about rights in the 588 
revealed phase, and one about agrarian conflict in the silencing phase. These results 589 
coincide with other studies illustrating that both the type of organizations and the 590 
alliances between organizations involved in campaigns influence the visibility of a 591 
conflict and the arguments of those involved (Brad 2015; Castellanos-Navarrete and 592 
Jansen 2015; Pye 2010; Wolford 2004). Alliances between environmental and agrarian 593 
organizations have contributed to depict some conflicts as agrarian or environmental 594 
struggles on a national and transnational scale, for example through campaigns against 595 
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climate change, agrofuels, deforestation and land grabbing (Pye 2010; Brad 2015), and 596 
the development or breakdown of alliances between NGOs and peasant organizations 597 
and the local population have also sometimes contributed to mask existing conflicts 598 
(Wolford 2004; Castellanos-Navarrete and Jansen 2015).  599 
In the Polochic, the evolution of the conflict forced peasant organizations and NGOs to 600 
change their strategies, and to form new alliances with international NGOs. Similar to 601 
other violent agrarian conflicts, the organizations opted to condemn the violation of 602 
human rights at the international, rather than the national level (Künnemann and 603 
Monsalve 2013, Marin-Burgos 2014). In Guatemala, where the economic power of 604 
oligarchic families is historically linked to legislative and judicial power (Casaús-Arzú 605 
2010), the human rights framework has not worked in favor of the demands of 606 
Polochic’s indigenous population, where the right to life, food and housing continues to 607 
be denied (OACNUDH 2013). In this case, most of the organizations involved in 608 
support of disposed families are not self-identified as a human right organization, 609 
however they used the rights framework in different ways, such as claiming the rights to 610 
land, to food or to housing for indigenous and peasant communities.   611 
According to Monsalve (2013), the functionality of the international human rights 612 
framework (UN 1948) depends on the particular context and the extent to which the 613 
framework itself has been developed. The results of this research illustrate that a human 614 
rights framework does not by itself allow for an effective denunciation of what Galtung 615 
(1969) would call “structural violence” or what Nixon (2011) terms “slow violence”. 616 
The latter refers to the damage to marginalized populations that occurs continuously 617 
through time and space, causing almost imperceptible socio-ecological changes (ibid.). 618 
In this case, slow violence is the process of dispossessing the Maya-Q’eqchi’ population 619 
of their resources through contamination process and the persistent denial of historical 620 
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rights to land of indigenous communities. This process has provoked, malnutrition, 621 
poverty, labor exploitation and the loss of biodiversity (Alonso-Fradejas 2012, 622 
Mingorría et al 2014).  623 
As opposed to direct violence, this kind of “structural” or “slow violence” is more 624 
difficult to denounce in front of the IACHR or national courts since international NGO 625 
donors neither finance nor support long processes of denunciation. Difficulties also 626 
emerge from the mechanisms and language that would need to be used for such a 627 
purpose, requiring human rights “professionals”, and the coordination between national 628 
and international organizations and local communities. In addition, such “slow 629 
violence” is occurring in a falsely named post-conflict context. In the Polochic case, 630 
international human rights NGOs only intervened to denounce the incidents of direct 631 
violence when there was “proof” – photographs and witnesses – to present to 632 
international agencies.  633 
The intervention and exit strategies of organizations also caused the conflict to be 634 
revealed or silenced. The interference of human rights and international development 635 
NGOs elevated the conflict to an international scale, at the same time that their exit or 636 
non-intervention silenced the conflict. Financial support was present in all phases of the 637 
conflict: from the logistics of the meetings against agro-fuels in the silenced phase, the 638 
human rights framework-based complaints and documentary filming in the revealed 639 
phase through to the march and the international campaign in the silencing phase. The 640 
strategy of the CUC in the silencing phase perhaps  influenced by the international 641 
funds it had received from Oxfam to develop a more globally visible campaign. Once 642 
the campaign finished, the organizations’ involvement in the conflict dropped 643 
significantly. Although CUC has kept loyal to their own political agenda and principles, 644 
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they have been conditioned by a context of shrinking international development 645 
cooperation in the last ten years. 646 
Moreover, the increased tensions between and within NGOs and peasant organizations 647 
due to mistrust, their different strategies and also their fatigue during that transition is 648 
likely to influence the Polochic struggle in the short-term future. Such tension and 649 
breakdown of alliances on an international scale occurred among the international 650 
human rights and national organizations.. Over the course of the conflict, international 651 
NGOs pursued specific campaigning actions at international level, while national and 652 
local organizations diverged in their strategies depending on the type of organization 653 
that they were (development, research or peasant). In other studies, tensions have also 654 
been noted between organizations that seek to negotiate and define sustainability criteria 655 
with regard to oil palm production and those that are against the expansion of oil palm 656 
in and of itself (Borras 2015; Marin-Burgos 2014).  657 
Conclusions 658 
This article has argued that the level of violence and threat, the role of state, and the 659 
funding context of NGOs and peasant organization, their strategies and alliances 660 
involved have influenced the evolution of the flex-crops’ conflict in the Polochic. The 661 
support of peasant organizations, many of which had an origin in revolutionary guerrilla 662 
groups during Guatemala’s civil war, has played a key historical role in the defense of 663 
the territory and the struggle for land access (Alonso-Fradejas 2015). Their current role 664 
in the conflict over oil palm and sugarcane plantations in the Polochic has also been 665 
important, because they have acted as key community supporters and brokers of peasant 666 
demands in front of governmental institutions.  667 
The analysis of the Polochic conflict has shown that the alliances between NGOs and 668 
the rural population have weakened over time, with a decrease in the number of NGOs 669 
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present in the region. Tensions and disagreement due to divergent strategies and 670 
ideologies have prevented the formation of a solid peasant movement (Bastos and 671 
Camus 2003). Direct violence and the threat of violence are key factors behind this 672 
weakening, associated with new dynamics in the expansion of flex-crops and the top-673 
down advocacy in the silenced phased of the conflict by a few international and national 674 
NGOs. This has prevented local communities’ strategies from taking center stage. As a 675 
result of these dynamics, the Polochic conflict is publicly touted as one that is resolved 676 
although a concealed, conflict remains.  677 
The triangulated methods used in this article have enabled me to observe possible 678 
contradictions between the results obtained from participant observation, semi-679 
structured interviews and content analysis (Nightingale 2015). For example, content 680 
analysis showed the conflict to be resolved and successful in the silencing phase, but the 681 
interviews illustrated that it was still there and even more complex than in previous 682 
years. The results furthermore show the importance of a dynamic and multi-scale 683 
perspective in the analysis of conflict, since the visibility and nature of a conflict 684 
depends on the scale and moment of analysis and the stakeholders interviewed. Also, 685 
the results suggest that no transversal social movement has yet been created in the 686 
Polochic to effectively articulate environmental, social, cultural, economic and labor 687 
demands against flex-crops, or to address the tension between the sometimes divergent 688 
aims and strategies of NGOs, peasant organizations and the local indigenous population.  689 
Future studies could conduct a historical analysis of the changes in the language used by 690 
Guatemalan agrarian and environmental justice movements to denounce structural 691 
violence that emerges in the expansion of flex-crops, and why such changes have 692 
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Meaning of acronym and work areas related 
with the Polochic case 





Equipo de Estudios Comunitarios y Acción 
psicosocial (Community Study and Psychosocial 
Action Team) 
 
Provides psychosocial support to the victims of the 
Guatemalan Civil War 
Former specialist 
member of the 
organization 
National Development 
UVOC Unión Verapacense de Organizaciones 
Campesinas (Verapaz Union of Peasant 
Organizations)  
 
Campaigns for integrated rural development 
through legal and organizational guidance with 
access to and use, tenancy and ownership of land, 
labor rights, community and productive 
development. Pressures for, negotiates and 
proposes laws before Congress. 
One representative 
and one field 
specialist 
National Peasant 
CUC Comité de Unidad Campesina (Committee for 
Peasant Unity) 
 
Campaigns for integrated rural development 
through legal and organizational guidance with 
access to and use, tenancy and ownership of land, 
labor rights, community and productive 
development. Pressures for, negotiates and 
proposes laws before Congress. 
One representative 







Meaning of acronym and work areas related 
with the Polochic case 
Interviewees Operational scale of 
action 
Focus on 
CONGCOOP Coordinadora de ONGs y Cooperativas  
(NGO and cooperatives coordinator)  
 
A consortium of research institutes and affiliates 
focused on the integrated rural development of the 
peasant population. As well as research, it makes 
proposals for public policies and shares 
information with organizations and the peasant 
population 
Two researchers National Research and 
Development 
CONCAD Consejo Cristiano de Agencias de Desarrollo 
(Christian Council of Development Agencies) 
 
Affiliated to the CONGCOOP, in charge of 
fostering local power through participation on 
Community Development Boards in the 
municipalities of Panzós, Alta Verapaz 
One representative Regional Development 
FGT Fundación Guillermo Toriello 
 
Fosters integrated rural development by supporting 
the legal security of the land, territorial planning 
and developing the community economy 
One representative 
and one field 
specialist 
National Development 
Action Aid Promotes compliance with human rights among the 
landless peasantry and rural population by funding 
local organizations and condemning rural injustices 
One representative 
and one researcher 






Meaning of acronym and work areas related 
with the Polochic case 
Interviewees Operational scale of 
action 
Focus on 
El Observador Researches the socio-political and economic 
dynamics of Guatemala, paying special attention to 
the mechanisms for introducing monocultures and 
mining, hydroelectricity and hydrocarbon mega-
projects 
Ex-researcher National Research 
HRC Human Rights Commission 
 
Presents and supports claims by the Guatemalan 
population whose human rights have been violated 
by extractive industries, abuses of military force 
(especially if supported by the USA) and abuses of 




International Human Rights 
Right Action On a local scale, supports the defenders of human 
rights that are at risk, supports condemnations of 
violations and on an international scale identifies 
and analyzes the parties responsible for violations 
and promotes activism in Northern Hemisphere 
countries and on all scales builds alliances to work 
for justice, equality, human rights and a fair 
environment and development 
Coordinator and 
two field specialists 
International Human Rights 
Intermon Oxfam International campaign to deliver land to 769 
evicted families: funds reports on the situations of 
the evicted families, performs actions in different 
cities of the world, takes part in dialogues with the 




International NGO, Human Rights 





Table 1. - Definitions of the main roles attached to NGOs during the Polochic conflict 
 
Role Definition 
Counterpart/partner  Serve as the voice and image that responds to 
the agenda and requirements of another 
organization that has the resources  
Denunciation Obtain information about the origin of the 
conflict and hold press conferences, issue 
press releases or transfer information to other 
organizations that influence international 
agencies.   
Present the information to international 
agencies  
Facilitation Support collective strategy-defining 
processes: provide information, coordinate 
joint events, fund meetings, offer a collective 
identity to the peasantry 
Mobilization of resources Fundraise from local and foreign sources to 
organize major campaigns and large-scale 
mobilizations  
Negotiation with the State Present arguments to state institutions and 
discuss and agree to measures 
Protest Organize and coordinate protests such as 
demonstrations and strikes 
Research Conduct studies of the causes of the conflict  
Support Support communities with their everyday 
needs: legal, organizational and technical 
guidance 
Type of alliances  
Coalition Four or more networked organizations 
Strong alliances Less than four networked organizations and a 
trust relationship  
Weak alliances Less than four networked organizations but 
lack of trust relationship 
 40 







Visibility Latent Visible Visible Latent 
Scale of visibility (number 
of news items) 
Regional 
(2) 







Intensity of violence High Very high High 
Iramuteq cluster analysis 
(% news items) 
- - Class 3 (49.2%): Eviction, 
Police, peasant death, rights 




Struggle, desire to work 
- 
Type of NGOs by 
operational scale of action 

















Peasant UVOC, CUC 
Psychosocial ECAP 
Research CONGCOOP Action Aid, El 
Observador 
Fostering Peasant Economies 
CONGCOOP, FGT 
Participation COCAD 
Peasant UVOC, CUC 
Psychosocial ECAP 
Research CONGCOOP 
Action Aid,  
Fostering Peasant Economies  
CONGCOOP, FGT 
Human Rights HRC, Right 
Action, 
Participation COCAD 
Peasant UVOC, CUC 
Research CONGCOOP 






Peasant UVOC, CUC 




































(ECAP, CUC, CONGCOOP, 

































Strong coalition (5) and weak 
alliances ((5) and (2)) 
Weak alliances ((1) and 
(3)) 
Weak alliance ((1) and 
(1)) 
Weak alliance  ((1) and 
(1)) 
 
  The principal scale of action is regional 
 The principal scale of action is national 




Figure 1. Case study area: The Polochic Valley 
 
 Source: Mingorría et al (2014). The red area represents the oil palm plantations, the yellow area 
represents the sugar cane plantations and the green area demarcates the Sierra de las Minas and 
Bocas del Polochic protected areas.  
 
Figure 2. Methodological strategy and research objectives 
 
Figure 3. Conflict dynamics during the Silenced phase: NGOs alliances and main events 
 
Figure 4. Conflict dynamics during the Revealed phase: NGOs alliances and main events 
 




Figure 1. Case study area: The Polochic Valley. 
Source: Own elaboration based on information from Geographic Information System 
of Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food of Guatemala (SIG-MAGA); and 
observations during the fieldwork. The black polygons represents the oil palm 
plantations, the white polygons represents the sugar cane plantations and the grey 




Figure 2. Methodological strategy and research objectives. 
 
Figure 3. Conflict dynamics during the Silenced phase: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) alliances and main events.  
 
Figure 4. Conflict dynamics during the Revealed phase: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) alliances and main events.  
 
Figure 5. Conflict dynamics during the Silencing phase: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) alliances and main events. 
